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ECONOMIC RATIONALITY AND ETHICAL VALUES IN
DESIGN-DEFECT ANALYSIS: THE TROLLEY PROBLEM AND
AUTONOMOUS VEHICLES
W. BRADLEY WENDEL*
I.

INTRODUCTION: MACHINE ETHICS AND THE TROLLEY PROBLEM

In the future with self-driving cars, the sensors and software of an
autonomous vehicle may be confronted by a dilemma: crash into a
telephone pole, killing the driver, or swerve into a crowd, killing five
people. This may sound familiar if you have taken an introductory
ethics class. Ethics teachers are fond of using the so-called trolley
problem, introduced by Philippa Foot and further developed by Judith
Jarvis Thomson,1 to illustrate the difference between consequentialist
and deontological moral theories. Moral theorists have used the trolley
problem to explore subtle issues including the nature of intention, the
doctrine of double effect (Foot's original use of the thought
experiment), the act/omission distinction, agent-relative versus agentneutral duties, moral agency and "authorship" of wrongs, and the
problem of moral luck. 2 In the original version of the problem, the
reader envisions herself in charge of a switch on a railroad track. A
runaway trolley hurtles down the track, which, if left as is, will result in
*
Professor of Law, Cornell University. The author gratefully acknowledges
the research funding provided by the Judge Albert Conway Memorial Fund for Legal
Research, established by the William C. and Joyce C. O'Neil Charitable Trust.
1. See PHILIPPA FOOT, The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of Double
Effect, in VIRTUES AND VICES 19 (1978); Judith Jarvis Thomson, Killing, Letting Die,
and the Trolley Problem, in RIGHTS, RESTITUTION, AND RISK: ESSAYS IN MORAL

THEORY 78 (William Parent ed., 1986); Judith Jarvis Thomson, The Trolley Problem,
in RIGHTS, RESTITUTION, AND RISK, supra, at 94.
2. See, e.g., Michael Gorr, Thomson and the Trolley Problem, 59 PHIL. STUD.

91 (1990).
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the trolley crashing into a minivan containing five people. By opening
the switch, however, the reader can divert the trolley onto a section of
track where a railroad employee is performing maintenance, resulting
in his death. (As with many fanciful stories in philosophy, it is left
unexplained precisely how this situation arose, and how the reader
wound up in the role of trolley switch-attendant.) In any event, the issue
is supposed to be clear: do nothing and passively allow the death of five
people, or act and allow the death of one person while saving five
others? If it seems clear that switching the trolley onto the track with
one potential victim is the right thing to do, would the same principle
apply to the situation facing a transplant surgeon who needs five organs
to save five different patients, and who learns that in her hospital is a
healthy person whose organs happen to be a perfect match for the five
3
others otherwise certain to die?
Many journalists and other commentators in the popular media
have been captivated by the trolley problem and its myriad variations
as they might arise for engineers designing autonomous vehicles. It has
been described as "the focus of fierce debate among technologists
around the world.' ' 4 As an article in Wired puts it, "[p]eople seem more
than a bit freaked out by the trolley problem right now.",5 The Atlantic
reported on an ethical-engineering collaboration between Stanford
University and driverless-car researchers at Google and Tesla using the
trolley problem as a "useful springboard" for approaching the design of
decision-making algorithms. 6 The problem does not arise only for fully
autonomous ("driverless") vehicles, 7 but is implicated in semiautonomous cars with present-generation technology, such as Tesla's
3.

Thomson, supra note 1, at 80.

4.

Alex Hem, Self-Driving Cars Don 't Care About Your Moral Dilemmas,

GUARDIAN (Aug. 22, 2016).
5. Aarian Marshall, Lawyers, Not Ethicists, Will Solve the Robocar "Trolley
Problem, "WIRED (May 28, 2017).
6.
See Lauren Cassani Davis, Would You Pull the Trolley Switch? Does it
Matter?, ATLANTIC (Oct. 9, 2015).

7.
The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA)
distinguishes among levels of automation based on whether the driver or an automated
system is primarily responsible for monitoring the driving environment. A vehicle
may have multiple systems, some of which are highly automated, on NHTSA's
definition, others of which are less highly automated. See U.S. DEPT. OF
TRANSPORTATION, FEDERAL AUTOMATED VEHICLES POLICY 11 (Sept. 2016)
[hereinafter "DOT AV Policy"].
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Automatic Emergency Braking. Should such a system be programmed
to take control away from a human driver if the car senses the driver is
deliberately driving the car toward a group of people? 8 The topic has
generated enough interest that a group of researchers sought to
determine the preferences of survey respondents regarding an
autonomous vehicle's solution to the trolley problem. 9 Should the car
sacrifice one person to save the lives of five others? What if the one
person in question is the driver? Perhaps unsurprisingly, study
participants' preferences varied depending on whether they were asked
to imagine themselves as the driver. Participants who assumed they
would be in the driver's seat were considerably more likely to wish for
a car that did not make the utility-maximizing calculation that one lost
life was better than five. As a result, people may buy fewer self-driving
cars, failing to mitigate the problem of crashes caused by driver error. 10
Perhaps aware of this finding, a Mercedes-Benz executive stated that if
faced with the choice between running over a child who unexpectedly
darted into the road and steering suddenly, causing a rollover accident
that would kill the driver, an automated Mercedes would opt to kill the
child. "1
To be sure, not everyone thinking about the design of self-driving
cars is obsessed with the trolley problem. A Google engineer working
on that company's autonomous-vehicle program noted that if a vehicle
found itself in the situation of having to choose between "the baby
stroller or the grandmother" it would mean that there was a mistake a
few second earlier in the accident sequence; thus, an ethical software
engineer would concentrate on designing systems that minimize the
likelihood of getting into a trolley-type dilemma in the first place. 12 In
8. See Patrick Lin, Here's How Tesla Solves a Self-Driving Crash Dilemma,
FORBES (Apr. 5, 2017).
9. Jean-Franqois Bonnefon, Azim Shariff& Iyad Rahwan, The SocialDilemma
ofAutonomous Vehicles, SCIENCE (June 24, 2016).
10. A New York Times article reports that 37,000 people died in car accidents
last year in the U.S., "most from human error." David Leonhardt, Driverless Cars
Made Me Nervous. Then I Tried One, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 22, 2017); see also DOT AV
Policy, supra note 7, at 5 (estimating that 94% of car accidents are the result of human

error).
11.

See David Z. Morris, Mercedes-Benz's Self-Driving Cars Would Choose

PassengerLives Over Bystanders,FORTUNE (Oct. 15, 2016).

12.

Hem, supra note 4.
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many of these scenarios, the right answer is always "slam on the
brakes." 13 And, callous as it may sound, even if an automated system
does occasionally make the wrong call, the net impact on safety is likely
to be substantially positive given the improvement technology offers
over error-prone human drivers. 14 The first pedestrian death involving

13. Id.
14. Leonhardt, supra note 10. In an otherwise engaging article, the author
makes a statement that should not go unchallenged: "Technology creates an
opportunity to save lives ....Just look at commercial airlines: Automation has helped
all but eliminate fatal crashes among American air carriers. The last one happened in
2009." Technology has enabled aircraft manufacturers and airlines to engineer out
risks that formerly contributed to accidents. Examples include Traffic Collision
Avoidance Systems ("TCAS"), which has all but eliminated the risk of midair
collisions in terminal-area airspace; Ground-Proximity Warning Systems ("GPWS"),
which drastically cut down on controlled flight into terrain ("CFIT") accidents; and
Predictive Windshear Alerting Systems ("PWS"), which reduced the risk of
dangerous low-level windshear encounters. Better training for flight crews,
particularly emphasis on Crew-Resource Management ("CRM") also played a role in
reducing risk in commercial aviation. But it is a strongly-held belief in the aviation
community that automation, as distinct from technology more generally, has created
new risks of automation dependency that may have offset the reduction in risk
attributable to automation. Inattention to or lack of proficiency in basic hand-flying
skills is a contributing factor in several recent accidents, including the crash of Asiana
Airlines flight #214 at San Francisco International Airport. See NATIONAL
TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD, ACCIDENT REPORT: DESCENT BELOW VISUAL
GLIDEPATH AND IMPACT WITH SEAWALL ASIANA AIRLINES FLIGHT 214 (2013),

The problem of
https://dms.ntsb.gov/public/55000-55499/55433/563979.pdf.
reversion to manual control is also an ever-present issue with automated control
systems, as is the introduction of different types of programming errors. See generally
Earl L. Wiener, Cockpit Automation, in HUMAN FACTORS IN AVIATION 433 (Earl L.
Wiener & David C. Nagel eds., 1988).
This is a subject that is of central importance to the design of semi-autonomous
cars and the liability of manufacturers. A fuller discussion must await a different
occasion, but for now the point is that automation dependency is regarded as a serious
risk in commercial aviation and needs to be taken seriously when designing interfaces
between automated vehicles and human drivers. Curious readers are invited to Google
"Children of the Magenta Line." American Airlines training captain Warren
Vanderburgh coined that term to describe automation-dependent pilots who had
forgotten that flight-management systems are tools for reducing workload at critical
phases of flight, not substitutes for good old-fashioned piloting. The video in which
he describes his experience flying the line with pilots who, quite understandably, had
become overly dependent on automation is a bona fide classic in the aviation world.
See, e.g., Editorial, How to End Automation Dependency, AVIATION WEEK & SPACE

2018]

THE TROLLEY PROBLEM AND AUTONOMOUS VEHICLES

133

an autonomous vehicle, in March 2018, in a car conducting testing for
Uber, did not appear to involve any decision by the car's software to
sacrifice the pedestrian's life to save the driver or others.15
Nevertheless, it appears that the trolley problem is now firmly
established as a heuristic for an important normative issue connected
with the design of autonomous and semi-autonomous vehicles. The
issue is, what ethical standards should be employed when evaluating an
engineering decision that plays out in an action taken by the vehicle, as
opposed to the driver? Should autonomous systems make utilitymaximizing decisions, or should they consider persons in general, or
specifically the driver, as having inherent value? The trolley problem
supposedly bears on this debate, at least to the extent it supposedly
reveals the intuitions people have concerning the process of ethical
decision-making.
II. AMORAL MACHINES?

In this paper I would like to make a modest, but pointed,
intervention in the debate over the trolley problem and autonomous
vehicles. A researcher at Stanford University recently declared the
debate had already been concluded by, of all things, the law. 16 While
moral philosophers were busy spinning out fantastic scenarios
involving runaway trolleys and portly men being pushed off bridges
(really, this is one variation in the literature), ' 7 lawyers and judges in
TECH. (July 19, 2013) (citing Capt. Vanderburgh's "famous lecture" on the paradox
of automation).
15.
See, e.g., Sam Levin, Video Released of Uber Self-Driving Crash That
Killed Woman in Arizona, GUARDIAN (Mar. 21, 2018); Heather Somerville et al.,
Uber's Use of Fewer Safety Sensors Prompts Questions After Arizona Crash,
REUTERS (Mar. 27, 2018).
16.
Bryan Casey, Amoral Machines, or: How Roboticists Can Learn to Stop
Worrying and Love the Law, 111 Nw. U. L. REv. 231 (2017).
17. See Thomson, supra note 1, at 82-83; DAVID EDMONDS, WOULD You KILL
THE FAT MAN? THE TROLLEY PROBLEM AND WHAT YOUR ANSWER TELLS US ABOUT

RIGHT AND WRONG 36-38 (2015). Although the stripped-down versions of trolleytype problems can seem silly, they are intended to track the features of very real moral
dilemmas. Edmonds's popular history of the trolley problem begins with Winston
Churchill's decision in 1944 to feed disinformation to the Germans which would
foreseeably result in thousands of deaths in South London (from unguided German
V- 1 "buzz bombs") but save more lives, and protect government infrastructure, nearer
to the center of the city. Id. at 1-7. President Harry Truman's decision to drop atomic
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tort cases were busily establishing liability principles that answer the
normative questions facing designers of autonomous vehicles. In this
article, entitled Amoral Machines, the author contends that, while
machine ethicists may fret over the balance of consequentialist and
deontological considerations that an autonomous system should take
into account when choosing between the driver and bystanders,
autonomous-vehicle manufacturers will simply make decisions that
minimize their exposure to legal liability.1 8 They will act as the
proverbial "bad man," described by O.W. Holmes, Jr., who cares about
the law not because he believes it has any claim on his allegiance, but
because he wishes to avoid legal sanctions. 19 Those decisions to prefer
profit over ethics will result in algorithms that ignore negative
externalities and take into account "only those costs the firm can expect
to incur."' 20 Depending on the applicable liability regime-strict
liability, for example, as compared with negligence--designers will
program vehicles differently, but always with the objective of
minimizing the firm's liability. Ethical reasoning, however, is entirely
beside the point.
This analysis in Amoral Machines is deeply confused in both
matters of jurisprudence and tort law. The Holmesian bad man point of
view is best understood as a caution not to interpret moralized language
in the law (such as duty, reasonable care, good faith, and so on) as if it
had the same meaning in the law as it does in ordinary life. 21 In this
way, it is not a particularly profound insight, but merely a restatement
of the central claim of legal positivism, that a norm is entitled to be
called "law" because it was enacted by a particular social process, not
because it is just or in furtherance of the common good. However, this
does not mean that legal norms cannot track or incorporate moral
principles. A lawyer would be well-advised to do some research to see
what reasonable care or good faith requires under applicable legal
bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, with the intention of ending the war early and
avoiding the deaths of hundreds of thousands of combatants and civilians, has a
similar structure. Id. at 23-24.
18. Casey, supra note 16, at 234.
19. Id. at 244 (discussing Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10
HARV. L. REV. 457, 459-62 (1897)).
20. Id. at 247.
21. See David Luban, The Bad Man and the Good Lawyer, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1547, 1562-63 (1997).
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standards, rather than simply consulting her moral compass. But it may
turn out that what is legally required or permitted coincides with what
is morally required or permitted. Tort law is full of examples of legal
duties or privileges that make perfect sense from a moral point of view.
The famous maxim "danger invites rescue," 22 which is part of the law
of proximate causation, is also a principle of folk morality: a tortfeasor
who causes a primary injury is also liable to rescuers, because it is a
normal human tendency to want to come to the aid of someone in peril.
Implied assumption of risk cases may turn on an assessment of the
social value of an activity, as in Judge Cardozo's entertaining opinion
concerning the "Flopper" ride on Coney Island. 23 The analysis of legal
duty is often explicitly moralized, as in the Rowland/Tarasofffactors
employed by the California Supreme Court and picked up in many other
jurisdictions. 24 The common law of punitive damages is replete with
moral descriptions of the defendant's conduct as "wanton," "reckless,"
"consciously indifferent to the welfare of others," and is characterized
by "malice,.... spite," "ill will," or even a "disposition of perversity. '25
22. Wagner v. Int'l Ry., 133 N.E. 437 (N.Y. 1921) (Cardozo, J.).
23. Murphy v. Steeplechase Amusement Co., 166 N.E. 173 (N.Y. 1929). See
generally Kenneth W. Simons, Murphy v. Steeplechase Amusement Co.: While the
Timorous Stay at Home, the Adventurous Ride the Flopper, in TORTS STORIES 207
(Robert L. Rabin & Stephen D. Sugarman eds., 2003).
24. See Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976);
Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561 (Cal. 1968). For more recent applications, see
Randi W. v. Muroc Joint Unified Sch. Dist., 929 P.2d 582 (Cal. 1997). For an
application of the Rowland/Tarasoffapproach by an important state appellate court
outside of California, see J.S. v. R.T.H., 714 A.2d 924 (N.J. 1998). The California
duty analysis requires a balancing of multiple considerations, including the
foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered
injury, the closeness of the connection between the defendant's conduct and the
plaintiff's injury, the moral blameworthiness of the defendant's conduct, the policy of
preventing future harm, the insurability of the liability, and the extent of the burden
on the defendant and, indirectly, to the community as a whole. The California court's
approach was at one time so prevalent in the analysis of the duty element that a leading
torts treatise stated that a court's determination that a duty exists is nothing more than
"an expression of the sum total of those considerations of policy which lead the law
to say that the particular plaintiff is entitled to protection." W. PAGE KEETON ET AL.,
PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 357-58 (5th ed. 1984).
25. See, e.g., Owens-Ill., Inc. v. Zenobia, 601 A.2d 633 (Md. 1992); National
By-Products, Inc. v. Searcy House Moving Co., 731 S.W.2d 194 (Ark. 1987); Taylor
v. Superior Court, 598 P.2d 854 (Cal. 1979). Unsurprisingly, Richard Posner proposed
an economic rationale for punitive damages, wearing his hat as an appellate judge, in
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The idea of a separation of law and morality is really a caricature of
legal positivism, and not in any way an accurate description of the
relationship between legal and moral considerations.
This is pretty bland stuff. A more radical reading of Holmes, picked
up by some law and economics scholars, understands Holmes as
contending that legal duties are not duties at all, no matter what the law
says. The language of duty is instead a roundabout way of indicating
that legislatures or courts have set a certain price on conduct as opposed
to prohibiting it.26 For example, the likelihood of being ordered to pay
$250,000 in damages for ruining someone's reputation does not mean
that slander is wrong and people should refrain from it; rather, it means
only that it is an expensive activity. If one wishes to defame others and
can afford to pay the price, the law has nothing more to say about the
matter.27 Amoral Machines appears to be relying on this reading of
Holmes, but it is decidedly outside the mainstream among legal
philosophers. For one thing, the reduction of legal prohibitions to
prices or taxes cannot explain what would be wrong (if anything) with
avoiding legal penalties by bribing judges, intimidating witnesses, or
destroying evidence. The answer cannot be that those things are wrong,
because the law-as-price view is supposed to apply to all purported legal
duties. Moreover, as H.L.A. Hart pointed out, the radical reading of
Holmes also fails to account for the fact that many people often treat
the law as having normative significance. 28 That is, it establishes
reasons for action, independent of any antecedent reasons one may have
an interesting case involving a hotel owner's indifference to the presence of bedbugs.
See Mathias v. Accor Econ. Lodging, Inc., 347 F.3d 672 (7th Cir. 2003).
26. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Antitrust Suits by
Targets of Tender Offers, 80 MICH. L. REV. 1155, 1168 (1982) (arguing that rational
corporate managers ought to treat legal norms as a form of price or tax, not an outright
prohibition); Cynthia A. Williams, CorporateCompliance with the Law in the Era of
Efficiency, 76 N.C. L. REV. 1265 (1998) (describing and criticizing the Easterbrook
& Fischel position).
27. See Williams, supranote 26, at 1268. In fairness to Easterbrook and Fischel,
they exclude mala in se criminal offenses such as murder and rape, so it is unclear
what they would say slander. Maybe they think it is intrinsically wrong. In general,
however, their version of the Holmesian bad man point of view denies that the law
can actually prohibit anything. Conduct that is wrong in itself remains wrong; the law
prohibiting the conduct does not change the normative situation of those subject to
the law.
28. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 56, 82 (2d ed. 1994).
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had to avoid punishment. 29 A theory of law that fits awkwardly at best
with how the concept of law is used by ordinary folks is unlikely to be
the right one.
Here is where the second, and in many ways more important,
confusion arises. The author cites Learned Hand's famous B<PL
formula from the Carroll Towing case, and alludes briefly to the
position, developed by Guido Calabresi and Richard Posner, that the
Hand formula embodies an economic analysis of the negligence
standard.30 The idea is that an actor compares the expected accident
losses (PL) that could be prevented by the adoption of a burdensome
safety feature, practice, or product redesign (B). If the cost of the
additional safety precaution exceeds the savings in expected accident
losses, the additional precaution is wasteful from the social point of
view. Aggregate social welfare is maximized at the point at which the
marginal cost of additional safety precautions is equal to the marginal
benefit in terms of reduced accident costs. Never mind that juries are
never instructed to engage in explicit cost-benefit calculation. 31 The
more substantive problem with the economic reading of the Hand
formula is that it fails to account for the results in a vast swath of torts
cases. Courts simply do not impose liability only where the cost of a

29.
Joseph Raz, Authority, Law, and Morality, in ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC
DOMAIN 210 (1994).

30. Casey, supra note 16, at 242 n.66, 248. The classic Hand-formula case is
United States v. CarrollTowing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947). Posner argued that
Hand had given an economic formulation of the social function of the negligence
standard, stated concisely: "Discounting (multiplying) the cost of an accident if it
occurs by the probability of occurrence yields a measure of the economic benefit to
be anticipated from incurring the costs necessary to prevent the accident." Richard A.
Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29, 32 (1972). The idea is that the
law should require actors to prevent the accidents that are worth preventing-i.e.
where the marginal cost of preventing them is less than the expected accident losses
if a precaution is not taken. The total social cost of accidents, as the sum of prevention
costs and accident costs, is thereby minimized. To put it differently, the level of
spending on accident prevention is efficient if courts employ the Carroll Towing
standard. See GuDO CALABRESI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS (1970); see also Guido
Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distributionand the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J.

499 (1961).
31. See Patrick J. Kelley & Laurel A. Wendt, What Judges Tell Juries About
Negligence: A Review of PatternJury Instructions,77 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 587 (2002);
Stephen G. Gilles, The Invisible Hand Formula,80 VA. L. REv. 1015 (1994).
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precaution is less than the accident cost savings. 32 A whole range of
other factors comes into the analysis including an ethical assessment of
the wrongfulness of the defendant's conduct; the defendant's duty
being correlative to the rights of the injured party. Corrective justice
and civil recourse theorists have for decades criticized economic
analysis for failing to account for the centrality of the concept of moral
wrongfulness in tort law. 33 A certain amount of rough, back-of-theenvelope-risk-utility analysis does go into evaluating when a
defendant's conduct falls below the standard of care. Although juries
may not be instructed on the Hand formula, reviewing courts will
sometimes go through an impressionistic risk-utility balance, 34 though
nothing like the kind of formal cost-benefit analysis required by
administrative law. In addition to informal balancing, courts also take
into account a wide range of factors that cannot be reduced to the cost
of taking a precaution or the expected accident losses foreseeably
notions such
prevented by the adoption of a precaution. Ordinary moral
35
law.
tort
in
as rights and wrongfulness are pervasive
Importantly for what will follow, economic analysis is inadequate
to account for the role played by the principle of responsibility.36 As
See, e.g., Lawrence A. Cunningham, Traditional Versus Economic
32.
Analysis: Evidence from Cardozo and Posner Torts Opinions, 62 FLA. L. REV. 667
(2010).
33. See, e.g., JULES COLEMAN, THE PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE (2001); Gregory
Keating, Is the Role ofTort to Repair Wrongful Losses?, in RIGHTS AND PRIVATE LAW
367 (Donal Nolan & Andrew Robertson eds., 2012); Mark Geistfeld, Economics,
Moral Philosophy, and the Positive Analysis of Tort Law, in PHILOSOPHY AND THE
LAW OF TORTS 250 (Gerald J. Postema ed., 2001); David G. Owen, Philosophical
Foundations of Fault in Tort Law, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW
201 (David G. Owen ed., 1995); John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Torts
as Wrongs, 88 TEX. L. REV. 917 (2010); Ernest J. Weinrib, The Special Morality of
Tort Law, 34 MCGILL L.J. 403 (1988).
34. See, e.g., Washington v. La. Power & Light Co., 555 So.2d 1350, 1355 (La.
1990) (noting that the court's intuitive risk-benefit balancing "is merely a shorthand
expression of the mental processes involved in such considerations" and that no court
can "mathematically or mechanically quantify, multiply or weigh risks, losses and
burdens of precautions.").
35. See Richard W. Wright, The Standards of Care in Negligence Law, in
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW, supra note 33, at 249; Heidi Li

Feldman, Prudence, Benevolence, and Negligence: Virtue Ethics and Tort Law, 74
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1431 (2000).

36.

COLEMAN,

supra note 33, at 15.
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Jules Coleman argues, economic analysis is a forward-looking theory
of tort law 37 that establishes an efficient level of spending on accident
prevention. There is no normative significance, in economic analysis,
to the relationship between a wrongdoer and someone injured as a result
of the wrongdoers acts or omissions. It would be a perfectly sensible
thing to dispense with the category of tort liability altogether, and work
instead with no-fault accident compensation (as in New Zealand), or a
public-law idea such as social-risk regulation. 38 But we do not do this.
American tort law is made up of many components parts, some
substantive, others structural. There are doctrinal elements such as
duty, standard of care, factual and proximate causation, and structural
features such as the bilateral relationship between the plaintiff and the
defendant, which is so obvious it often goes unnoticed. As Coleman
points out, however, a significant feature of our tort system difficult to
explain by an economic analysis of tort law is the fact that the victim
sues the injurer, rather than the person who is in the best position to
prevent accidents. 3 9 A number of misfortunes may befall a person in
the course of her life. Only some of those misfortunes are legally
actionable wrongs - that is, torts. Even on a fairly austere libertarian
conception of responsibility, misfortunes deemed to be torts have the
property, at least, of being attributable to human agency. "Volition and
causation distinguish doings from mere happenings: actions from other
events."' 40 One may add further conditions, such as a requirement of
moral or political fairness in the imposition of legal liability. 4 ' But a
forward-looking explanation, reducing all concepts in tort law to
accident-cost reduction, fails to make sense of the point and purpose of
the tort system as it is revealed through its rules and application by
judges and juries.

37. See Jules Coleman, Tort Law and Tort Theory: PreliminaryReflections on
Method, in PHILOSOPHY AND THE LAW OF TORTS, supra note 33, at 183, 186.
38. Coleman, supra note 37, at 196.
39. Id. at 188; see also COLEMAN, supra note 33, at 17 ("There is simply no
principled reason, on the economic analysis, to limit the defendant or plaintiff classes

to injurers and their respective victims.").
40. Coleman, supra note 37, at 198; see also COLEMAN, supra note 33, at 51
").
("Only agents are the proper objects of responsibility ....
41. Coleman, supra note 37, at 200; see also George P. Fletcher, Fairnessand
Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARv. L. REv. 537 (1972).
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A fallback position might be to contend that, whatever is true of tort
law generally, products liability law either is, or ought to be, treated
differently. Perhaps products liability is a distinctive domain of tort law
in which economic values and cost-benefit analysis should
predominate. Products liability law is parasitic on underlying tort
concepts such as reasonableness and causation. It is not separate from
torts in any meaningful sense. One might respond that manufacturers
are strictly liable for introducing defective products into the stream of
commerce. Thus, what may be true of a negligence-based liability
scheme, including related principles of proximate causation,
comparative fault, and allocation of damages among jointly responsible
tortfeasors, may not hold within the domain of strict liability. Applied
to autonomous vehicles, principles of strict liability may support the
Amoral Machines view that manufacturers will make design decisions
based solely on economic considerations. This is a mistake, too, but
one that is understandable in light of the evolution of products liability
law. As the next section will explain, courts talked about strict liability
in early and influential products liability decisions, but as the law
evolved, the substantive liability rules coalesced around what is
essentially a negligence standard. The modem analysis of designdefect cases, reflected in Section 2(b) of the Third Restatement, is
mostly indistinguishable from negligence.
That does not mean,
however, that cases engage in the efficiency analysis suggested by
Posner's reading of CarrollTowing. Design-defect cases are informed
by a cluster of values related to the utility of the product to the
consumer, in light 'of the performance of the product, its safety features,
and the expectations consumers have with respect to the product. A
modem court applying well-developed principles of design-defect
analysis would engage in a process of ethical decision-making that is
far from the Holmesian perspective described in Amoral Machines. To
make that claim stick, the next section will briefly explain how the law
of products liability evolved into what it is today.
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III. FROM NEGLIGENCE TO STRICT LIABILITY AND BACK AGAIN

Every first-year law student knows that strict liability for defective
products coalesced in the early 1960's, led by influential decisions from
the California Supreme Court. New York Court of Appeals Judge
Benjamin Cardozo's MacPherson decision had long since liberated
plaintiffs from the requirement of showing privity of contract in a
lawsuit against the manufacturer of a defective product, but the
underlying cause of action was still one for negligence. 4 3 Negligence
worked tolerably well in some cases, but in others, the plaintiff lacked
sufficient evidence to show the way in which the. manufacturer's
conduct fell below the standard of care. Traditional common-law
evidentiary doctrines like res ipsa loquitur were helpful to some
plaintiffs, but as California Supreme Court Justice Roger Traynor
recognized in an influential concurring opinion, the policy
considerations that supported relaxing the plaintiff s evidentiary burden
would also support recognizing - strict liability for product
manufacturers. 44 Manufacturers should be responsible for injuries
caused by product defects because they are in the best position to
prevent the hazard, and because the resulting accident losses can be
shifted and spread over the population of consumers. The plaintiff is
typically in a worse position, vis-&i-vis the manufacturer, to develop
evidence through investigation and discovery to show the cause of the
accident. This reasoning supports the application of res ipsa, but
Justice Traynor recognized that a manufacturer is also unlikely to be
able to introduce evidence sufficient to rebut the inference of
negligence, and as a result "the negligence rule approaches the rule of
strict liability."' 45 Justice Traynor's view became the majority position
in 1962,46 around the time that Professor William Prosser was writing

42.
See Sheila L. Birnbaum, Unmasking the Test for Design Defect: From
Negligence [to Warranty] to Strict Liability to Negligence, 33 VAND. L. REV. 593

(1980).
43.
44.

See MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916).
Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 440 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor,

J., concurring).
45. Id. at 441.
46. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1962). We can
set aside for present purposes the parallel developments in the law of contract
warranties, which had also served as a doctrinal hook for plaintiffs to bring products
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influential law review articles arguing for strict liability for
manufacturers of defective products. 47 Professor Prosser was then
serving as the Reporter to the American Law Institute's Second
Restatement of Torts, and drafted the provision that became Section
402A. It provided that anyone who "sells a product in a defective
condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer" is strictly
48
liable for the resulting harm.
It did not take courts long to realize the problem lurking in this
formulation. A manufacturer's liability is predicated on the finding of
a defect in the product or, in the language of the Second Restatement, a
conclusion that the product is in a defective condition unreasonably
dangerous to the user. Not every dangerous product is defective. I own
a heavy, sharp 10-inch cook's knife, which poses a risk to the fingertips
of an unwary user, but it is not legally defective. In drafting Section
402A, Prosser anticipated this issue and included language in the
commentary that distinguished dangerous products from those that are
defective: "The article sold must be dangerous to an extent beyond that
which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases
it, with the ordinary knowledge common to the community as to its
49
characteristics."
My cook's knife is just as dangerous as an ordinary consumer
would expect, given common knowledge of its characteristics. The idea
seemed to be that a defective product is one that-based on the ordinary
consumer's knowledge and expectations-is unreasonablydangerous.
However, even this interpretation seemed to be a step back from the
strict liability envisioned by the Second Restatement. The California
Supreme Court thought so, and cautioned that courts should not
liability claims against manufacturers. In a watershed case, the New Jersey Supreme
Court recognized a cause of action for breach of the implied warranty of
merchantability, but without the usual contract-law limitations of privity and
disclaimability. The warranty attaches to the product upon sale and would be breached
by a product that fails to perform as a reasonable consumer would expect. See
Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960). The impliedwarranty heritage of products liability law persists in the form of the consumerexpectation test for design defect, a subject which will be considered below.
47. See William L. Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the
Consumer), 50 MNN. L. REV. 791 (1966); William L. Prosser, The Assault Upon the
Citadel (StrictLiability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960).
48. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
49. Id. cmt. i.
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"burden[] the injured plaintiff with proof of an element which rings of
negligence."' 50 Requiring the plaintiff to prove both that a product was
defective and that the defect rendered the product unreasonably
dangerous appears to "ring of negligence." But the court also
recognized that manufacturers should not be treated as insurers of their
products, i.e. subjected to absolute liability, which differs from strict
liability. 51 There must be a limitation beyond which a court will not
permit a jury to conclude that a manufacturer should be liable. The
court believed the proximate cause element would do the necessary
analytical work, but proximate causation often turns on reasonable
foreseeability, and the word "reasonable" surely rings of negligence in
this context as well.
It became clear in hindsight that the early "ancestor" cases
like
MacPherson and Escola had all dealt with a particular type of defect,
known in modem law as a manufacturing defect.5 2 A manufacturing
defect exists when a particular product (a token of a type, to use
philosophical language) deviates from the manufacturer's prototype in
a way that causes it to fail and harm the plaintiff. Buick Motor Co., the
manufacturer in MacPherson,had presumably intended to use wood of
sufficient strength for the car's wheel spokes. Somehow, however, a
weaker piece of wood was introduced into the manufacturing process,
and as a result, the spoke failed, causing the car to crash. Similarly,
some unknown glitch in the manufacturing process caused the Coke
bottle in Escola to explode in the plaintiff's hand; the problem was
either in the process of the glass bottle manufacturer, Owens-Illinois, or
the manufacturer of the finished product, Coca-Cola. Manufacturing
defect cases are easy to prove. The plaintiff must show only that the
product departed from its intended design. 53 The manufacturer's
prototype will likely be discoverable and, in any event, it is a reasonable
inference that the manufacturer had not intended the weak wooden
spoke or the flaw in the bottle that made it susceptible to exploding
when handled roughly. Important for tracing the history of so-called

50.
51.
52.
LAW INST.

Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 501 P.2d 1153, 1162 (Cal. 1972).
Id.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2(a) (AM.

1998).

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY §
(AM. LAW INST. 1998).

53.

2(a) & cmt. c
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strict liability, it is entirely appropriate to speak of manufacturing defect
cases as involving true strict liability. Once the plaintiff establishes a
departure from the manufacturer's specifications and a causal
connection with her injury, the manufacturer is liable. The plaintiff
need not show that the manufacturer failed to use ordinary care. Proof
of a design defect never "rings of negligence."
The situation is entirely different with respect to design defect
cases. The California Supreme Court observed that "[a] defect may
emerge from the mind of the designer as well as from the hand of the
workman." 54 That is certainly true. However, the difference is that the
defect does not consist of a deviation from the manufacturer's
specifications. Rather, it is the specifications themselves that are
"defective. ' 55 But what does this mean? An obvious example would
be something like a large, powerful industrial machine that is not
guarded to prevent the user from inserting a body part into the machine
while it is operating. 56 The challenge in a case like this is to come up
with a way of evaluating the specifications as defective without either
(1) recognizing absolute liability or (2) creating a test that "rings of
negligence. ' 57 Finding liability regardless of the reasonableness of the
engineering design choices made by the manufacturer risks going
beyond strict liability into the imposition of absolute liability. 58 The
manufacturer would then be liable as an insurer; all the plaintiff would
need to show is a causal connection between her use of the product and
an injury. 59 If the test is, instead, that it would be unreasonable to fail
to equip the machine with a guard or interlock system, the standard
54.

Cronin, 501 P.2d at 1162.

55. •See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2(b) & cmt.
d (AM. LAW INST. 1998).
56. See, e.g., Jaramillo v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 906 N.E.2d 387 (N.Y. 2009)
(involving'an "open architecture" box-folding machine lacking an interlock device
that would shut the machine down if an open space is accessed by the user).
57. See John W. Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liabilityfor Products, 44
MIss. L.J. 825 (1973).
58. See, e.g., Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 447 A.2d 539 (N.J.
1982) (imposing liability for failure to warn of risks that, at the time, a reasonable
manufacturer would not have known).
.59.
See, e.g., Heaton v. Ford Motor Co.,, 435 P.2d 806 (Or. 1967)
(distinguishing absolute and strict liability). See also Wade, supra note 57, at 828
(noting that under absolute liability, the manufacturer of a match would be liable for
anything burned in a fire started by the match).
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would hark back to the idea of negligence as the failure to use ordinary
care. Courts occasionally tried to end-run that objection by claiming
the design-defect standard did not ring of negligence because
"negligence focuses on the conduct of the manufacturer while strict
liability focuses upon the product."' 60 That revision of the test in terms
of the subject of analysis-product versus manufacturer-ran into the
obvious objection that a finding of a product's design defect would
necessarily entail the conclusion that the manufacturer's conduct fell
below the standard of care; a reasonable manufacturer would not release
61
a product into the market that embodied an unreasonable design.
Some courts continued to maintain the fiction that there is a difference
between scrutinizing the manufacturer's conduct, which rings of
negligence, and evaluating the product for whether it is reasonably safe
or, instead, defective. 62 Eventually, however, courts accepted that the
best resolution of this issue was to emphasize the word "unreasonably"
in the Second Restatement formulation that liability follows a showing
that a product is in a defective condition if it is unreasonably dangerous
to the user. 63
It cannot be overemphasized that there now is a consensus among
courts and commentators that design-defect analysis does not follow a
true strict liability approach. 64 The Second Restatement test contained
the seeds of its own collapse. Liability requires showing a defect, and
in design cases, that means showing that the product is unreasonably
dangerous, not simply that an injury was causally connected to the
product's design. The Third Restatement's approach is to require the
plaintiff to show the existence of a reasonable alternative design that

60. Davis v. Globe Mach. Mfg. Co., 684 P.2d 692 (Wash. 1984); see also
Prentis v. Yale Mfg. Co., 365 N.W.2d 176 (Mich. 1984) (observing that this reframing
of the question "may have served to confuse, rather than enlighten, jurors").
61. See, e.g., Lecy v. Bayliner Marine Corp., 973 P.2d 1110 (Wash. Ct. App.
1999).
62. See, e.g., Anderson v. Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp., 810 P.2d 549 (Cal.
1991) (involving a claim for failure to warn, but presenting the same conceptual
issue).
63. See, e.g., Boatland of Houston, Inc. v. Bailey, 609 S.W.2d 743 (Tex. 1980);
Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 573 P.2d 443 (Cal. 1978).
64. See James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Achieving Consensus on
Defective ProductDesign, 83 CORNELL L. REv. 867 (1998).
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would have prevented the plaintiff's injury. 65 Significantly, the Third
Restatement has entirely given up the position that manufacturers are
subject to strict liability in design cases:
Assessment of a product design in most instances requires a
comparison between an alternative design and the product design
that caused the injury, undertaken from the viewpoint of a reasonable
person. That approach is also used in administering the traditional
reasonableness standard in negligence. The policy reasons that
support use of a reasonable-person perspective in connection with
the general negligence
standard also support its use in the products
66
liability context.
On the Third Restatement's risk-utility test, a jury should evaluate
the plaintiffs proposed alternative design to determine whether it is a
reasonablealternative design (a RAD, as it is often called). A product
is defective in design if the manufacturer's failure to incorporate a RAD
renders the product not reasonably safe. 67 The word "reasonable,"
which undoubtedly rings of negligence, is all over the black-letter test
and commentary on design defect. The Third Restatement's test
requires the trier of fact to balance the relative advantages and
disadvantages of the product as designed, as compared with the
plaintiffs proposed alternative. It can consider a variety of factors,
including 68 :
The magnitude and probability of the foreseeable risks of
harm posed by the manufacturer's design, including the user's
ability to avoid the risk by the use of reasonable care.
65.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY §

2(b) (AM.

LAW

INST. 1998).

66.

Id. cmt. d (citations omitted).

67.

Id. cmt. f.

68. Id. I have paraphrased and elaborated on the Comment f factors in the
summary in text. In doing so I have referred back to their original source. See Wade,
supra note 57, at 837-38. I am using bullet points and not numbers because the
numbering of the Wade factors does not correspond to the presentation of the factors
in Comment f. Nevertheless, I want to make it clear that the Restatement test is very
close to that proposed in Wade's 1973 article. See Richard L. Cupp, Jr., Defining the
BoundariesofAlternative Design Under the Restatement (Third)of Torts: The Nature
and Role of Substitute Products in Design Defect Analysis, 63 TENN. L. REv. 329,
340-43 (1996) (discussing relationship between Wade factors and Third Restatement
design-defect test).
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*

Consumer knowledge and expectations regarding the product,
which may have their source in the manufacturer's marketing
efforts, may simply be based on ordinary experience and
knowledge, or may be influenced by the instructions and
warnings accompanying the product. 69
* The relative advantages and disadvantages of the product as
designed and as it could have been designed, with
consideration of the effect of the alternative design on product
longevity, maintenance, repair, and aesthetics; for example,
with due consideration for the hassle sometimes created by
safety features and the natural tendency of users to disable
those that create a huge headache.
* The range of consumer choice among products; for example,
considering the appropriateness of a more dangerous but
more versatile or useful version of the product intended for
expert users.
The design-defect test can arguably be boiled down to one
consideration stated in an influential law review article: "The
manufacturer's ability to eliminate the unsafe character of the product
without impairing its usefulness or making it too expensive to maintain
its utility."' 70
On the modem design-defect test, my cook's knife is not defective
in design because, although it poses significant foreseeable risks, there
is no way to eliminate them without impairing the knife's usefulness.
A cook's knife has to be heavy and sharp to perform its function of
breaking down vegetables. A dull knife, obviously, would not be very
useful. There are kitchen gadgets, such as mandolines and food
69. One has to be careful here because the open and obvious nature of the
danger is not a sufficient reason for the manufacturer to avoid making a reasonable
design change that would reduce the risk. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:
PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 cmt. d, illus. 3 (AM. LAW INST. 1998). There may be cases,

however, in which the consumer's knowledge that a product will perform in a
particular way is a factor that goes into the analysis of whether the manufacturer has
a duty to incorporate a safety feature. See, e.g., McSwain v. Sunrise Med., Inc., 689

F. Supp. 2d 835, 842 (S.D. Miss. 2010) (holding that the wheelchair was not defective
in design for failure to incorporate anti-tip tubes, because plaintiff and his father knew

of the propensity of wheelchairs to tip backward and had chosen a model without antitip tubes).
70. Wade, supra note 57, at 837 (factor #4).
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processors, that chop and slice vegetables and incorporate additional
safety features, but they are not as versatile as a cook's knife, are a
hassle to clean, and are often more expensive than a serviceable knife.
Notice that the word "useful" here is not interpreted according to strict
economic cost-benefit analysis. The issue is not the economic burden
to the manufacturer in redesigning the knife. Rather, the analysis
focuses on the user's experience with the product, including its "safety
aspects... the likelihood that it will cause injury and the probable
seriousness of the injury." 71 Balanced against the safety aspects of the
product is not just the economic cost of a redesign but all of the
disutility that would be associated with the design change, as
considered from the user's point of view. The best product is not
always the safest product once the design-as a whole-is evaluated in
terms of its utility to the user.
Granted, the knife case would not involve a redesign but a
wholesale replacement of the knife with a different sort of tool, such as
a mandoline. However, the same analysis applies to a redesigned
version of essentially the same product. Guards and interlocks on
power tools can make them a hassle to use for certain applications. (I
have often been tempted to wire shut the "deadman" switch on my lawn
mower, which turns off the engine when the handle is released, because
the mower must be restarted every time I have to leave it to pick up a
stick or rock.) A canoe that is less likely to tip over may be slower and
more difficult to paddle. Old-school automobile passive-restraint
systems, such as automatic seat belts, drove many car owners spare until
airbags supplanted the automatic belts. 72 Full-coverage body armor for
law-enforcement officers is hot and restrictive, and may be less
appealing to officers than vests that leave some gaps in coverage. 73 All
of these examples illustrate the principle that the design-defect analysis
considers the utility of the user experience, including expected accident
costs, before and after the 'proposed redesign. The product is defective
in design only' if the plaintiff s proposed alternative is a RAD. This is
known as the risk-utility test.
71. See id. (factor #2).,72. See, e.g., Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861 (2000) (reviewing
the history of the Department of Transportation's Federal Motor Vehicle Safety
Standard 208, which required manufacturers to equip vehicles with passive restraints
starting in 1987).
73. See Linegar v. Armour of America, Inc., 909 F.2d 1150 (8th Cir. 1990).
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It is necessary to conclude this historical overview with a brief note
on a significant controversy in the development of the modem designdefect test. During the evolution of the design-defect standard, some
states adhered to a freestanding consumer-expectation test, in which the
expectations of consumers regarding product performance is not merely
a factor to be considered in the risk-utility balance but is dispositive of
the design-defect analysis. 74 In other words, a product was defective if
it violated the reasonable expectations of consumers regarding its
performance and safety. This test can be traced to the parallel
development of implied warranties of merchantability in contract law,
as an alternative doctrinal basis for holding the manufacturers of
defective products liable to consumers. 75 It is also rooted in Section
402A of the Second Restatement in which the "defective condition
unreasonably dangerous" standard was elaborated in the comments as
involving "a risk of physical harm to an extent beyond that
contemplated by the ordinary consumer...
with the ordinary
knowledge about the product's characteristics. '76
The trouble with the freestanding consumer-expectation test was
soon picked up by courts. 77 The issue was, not surprisingly, related to
the word "reasonable." The consumer-expectation test cannot be based
on the actual, subjective expectations of the plaintiff, but on those of a
hypothetical reasonable consumer. 78 But then the question becomes,
what expectations would a reasonable consumer have regarding product
safety? A consumer could reasonably expect a pickup truck to be able
to run over a one-inch rock without difficulty, but what about a six-inch
74. See, e.g., Green v. Smith & Nephew AHP, Inc., 2001 WI 109, 245 Wis. 2d
772, 629 N.W.2d 727; Delaney v. Deere & Co., 999 P.2d 930 (Kan. 2000); Potter v.
Chi. Pneumatic Tool Co., 694 A.2d 1319 (Conn. 1997). See also Aaron D. Twerski &
James A. Henderson, Jr., Manufacturer'sLiabilityforDefective ProductDesigns: The
Triumph of Risk-Utility, 74 BROOK. L. REv. 1061 (2009) (providing a review of the

case law and a defense of the risk-utility standard, by the Reporters to the Third
Restatement).
75. See Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960). As a
doctrinal basis for liability, implied warranty has been merged into the omnibus cause
of action for defective products, which sounds primarily in tort. See RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 cmt. n (AM. LAW INST. 1998).
76. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. i (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
77. See Henderson & Twerski, supra note 64, at 879-82.
78. See, e.g., Campbell v. Gen. Motors Corp., 649 P.2d 224, 233 n.6 (Cal.
1982).
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rock? 79 When it comes to complex product designs, inevitably
involving tradeoffs among a number of functional and safety factors, a
hypothetically reasonable consumer may have no expectations
whatsoever. That consideration led the California Supreme Court, in
an important case, to limit the consumer-expectation test to product
designs in which ordinary experience is sufficient to permit the trier of
fact to infer that the product failed to perform as a reasonable consumer
would expect. 80 For example, a bus passenger who was injured in a fall
was able to establish a design-defect claim using the consumerexpectation test because ordinary experience is sufficient to permit
reasonable people to form expectations concerning the location and
accessibility of handles and "grab bars" on a bus. 81 In complex design
cases, however, neither the plaintiff nor the trier of fact has sufficient
experience upon which to draw to evaluate whether the product violated
reasonable expectations of safety and performance. As with any factual
issue on which the trier of fact could be aided in understanding the
evidence or determining a fact at issue, expert testimony may be
introduced.82 The expert's opinions will be based on the sorts of
considerations taken into account by engineers or others who work on
These
these product-design issues in the relevant industry.
considerations will generally be those captured in the Third
Restatement's risk-utility analysis. In a case involving complex design
issues, it is difficult to avoid the collapse of the consumer-expectation
test into the risk-utility test. 83 On the Third Restatement's analysis, the
79. Heaton v. Ford Motor Co., 435 P.2d 806 (Or. 1967).
80. Soule v. Gen. Motors Corp., 882 P.2d 298 (Cal. 1994).
81. Campbell, 649 P.2d at 224.
82. FED. R. EviD. 702.
83. In a state purporting to employ the consumer-expectation test, the plaintiff's
lawyer quite wisely opted to introduce expert testimony showing the feasibility of a
design change to pneumatic power tools that allegedly would have prevented the
neurological impairment to the plaintiffs hands. The plaintiff, in effect, proved the
existence of a RAD using the risk-utility test as a kind of tacit background norm. See
Potter v. Chi. Pneumatic Tool Co., 694 A.2d 1319 (Conn. 1997). The court paid
considerable lip service to the consumer-expectation test, but the evidence in the case
is better understood on a risk-utility framework. Subsequent case law in Connecticut,
albeit unpublished and at the trial court level, supported this reading of Potter. See
Gershberg v. Camera Wholesalers, Inc., No. FSTCV126014627S, 2014 WL 1283077
(Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 26, 2014); Brierley v. Haas, No. WWMCV126005937S, 2014
WL 7714329 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 18, 2014). Then the Connecticut Supreme Court
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expectations of consumers regarding the product are a factor to be taken
into account in design-defect litigation, but are not by themselves
84
dispositive of the issue.

IV. THE MORALITY OF DESIGN-DEFECT ANALYSIS
With this overview in modem products liability law, we can turn to
the critique of the Amoral Machines thesis that autonomous vehicle
manufacturers do not need to engage in ethical decision-making
because the legal system has already resolved all of the relevant
questions. The article sets up a classic trolley-type problem by
imagining that the vehicle's software must instantaneously choose
between running into five teenagers or engaging in a sudden evasive
maneuver that will cause the car to overturn, killing its occupant. 85 On
the "amoral" analysis, the resolution of the dilemma is that the car
should avoid the teenagers, even if it results in the death of the driver.
The first mistake in the analysis is to assume that the manufacturer will
be strictly liable for the deaths of the teenagers, regardless of fault. 86
As explained in the previous Section, that is a complete mis-description
of the governing liability standard. It confuses strict liability with
absolute liability, which was never imposed. 87 Even in the early days
"modified" Potter(but reallyjust clarified what had been implicit in the case all along,
in my view) in a lengthy opinion. See Izzarelli v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 136
A.3d 1232 (Conn. 2016).
84. For a good illustration of the role of consumer expectations in modem
design-defect analysis, see Bourne v. Marty Gilman, Inc., 452 F.3d 632 (7th Cir.
2006). See also Vautour v. Body Masters Sports Indus., Inc., 784 A.2d 1178 (N.H.
2001) (explaining that the Second Restatement requirement of showing that a product
is unreasonably dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by
an ordinary consumer is analyzed using a risk-utility balancing test).
85. Casey, supra note 16, at 242-43.
86. Id. at 243.
87. Going the other direction, the article also contends that if the teenagers were
careless, they would be completely barred from recovery by the defense of
contributory negligence. See id. at 243. Although a few U.S. jurisdictions continue to
maintain contributory negligence as a complete defense, the overwhelming majority
has moved to a rule in which the plaintiff's recovery is reduced in proportion to the
share of responsibility allocated to the plaintiff by the trier of fact, but not barred
completely. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY §
7 & Reporters' Note (AM. LAW INST. 2000). Even in the few remaining true
contributory-negligence (complete bar) jurisdictions there may be common-law
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of products liability, when Section 402A of the Second Restatement
was the applicable standard, a manufacturer would be held liable only
for injuries caused by a defective vehicle. 88 Liability under Section
402A required a finding that the car was in a "defective condition
unreasonably dangerous," which is not strict liability at all, but a kind
of crypto-negligence standard. If the vehicle was not defective in
design, then the manufacturer would not be liable, regardless of the
causal connection between the design choices that went into the
software and the deaths of the teenagers.
Fast-forwarding to the modem standard of the Third Restatement,
Section 2(b), the question today would be whether the plaintiffs-here,
the families of the teenagers killed by the car--can show that a
reasonable alternative design (RAD) would have prevented the
accident, and that the car was unreasonably dangerous due to the
The plaintiffs proposed
omission of the alternative design.89
been a different decisionhave
would
alternative design presumably
making algorithm that would have swerved to avoid the teenagers,
resulting in the death of the driver. Would it be a RAD? To answer
that question, the trier of fact would be permitted to consider the factors
set out above, developed from decades of caselaw and scholarly
commentary. At this point, we can set aside the jurisprudential issue
raised by the Holmesian bad man point of view. Amoral Machines
contends that a profit-maximizing manufacturer will make productdesign decisions based solely on the content of legal liability rules, not
ethical principles:
Robotics systems of the future will undoubtedly make decisions of
immense ethical import. But their decisionmaking will be guided less
doctrines such as last clear chance that ameliorate the harsh effects of the rule. See id.
§ 3. Thus, the claim in the article that the causal contribution of the teenagers'
behavior is, sufficient to preclude their recovery is wildly inaccurate. In most
jurisdictions the factfinder would be required to assign a percentage of responsibility
for the accident.to the teenagers, based on a comparison between their risk-creating
conduct and that of the auto manufacturer. See id. § 8. In the minority of contributory
negligence states, the factfinder would first have to determine whether the teenagers
had been negligent (although this was stipulated in the hypothetical) and, if so,
whether an exception such as last clear chance applies.
88. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
89. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2(b) (AM. LAW.
INST. 1998).
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by the vagaries of "conscience" than by the "prophesy" of profit.
These robots will view the world not as good moral philosophers, but
as bad men - concerned less with idealized "ethical rule[s]" than with
the legal rules that dictate whether their firms will face public
sanction. And those that are instead engineered to follow "a clear and
consistent" moral code will behave irrationally under a legal code
90
lacking both such qualities.
Whatever one thinks about the Holmesian bad man perspective
generally, it should be clear that if the governing liability regime
permits a court to impose liability on the ground that the manufacturer's
design decisions do not embody the right ethical stance with respect to
consumers, then a purely profit-maximizing manufacturer would seek
to predict and respond to the ethical reasoning that a judge or jury is
likely to employ. And it should also be clear that the factors set forth
in Comment f to Section 2, the Wade article from which they are
derived, 91 and the voluminous caselaw applying the risk-utility test that
the applicable liability standard does not sidestep the ethical issue. In
fact, it poses it squarely.
Amoral Machines further asserts that "[s]ystems optimized for
profit will not fret over negative externalities, but only those costs the
firm can expect to incur."' 92 It is not much of an exaggeration to say
that, on the law and economics account, the entire point of tort law is to
force a profit-maximizing firm to internalize negative externalities as a
way of incentivizing it to determine whether they could be avoided, at
lesser cost, through the adoption of a safety precaution or product
redesign. 93 Thus, a manufacturer had better fret over negative
90.
91.

Casey, supra note 16, at 244-45.
See Wade, supra note 57.

92.

Casey, supra note 16, at 248. Note that this sentence makes a factual claim

about what manufacturers will do, not what they ought to do. One long-standing
criticism of economic analysis is that whatever methodological merit there is in
making simplifying behavioral assumptions about human motivation, a further
normative argument is necessary to support the conclusion that people ought to
behave as self-interested utility maximizers. See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, Is Wealth a
Value?, in A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 237 (1985). For present purposes, however, I am
willing to bracket this issue because it is quite clear that applicable legal standards
require the manufacturer to engage in ethical reasoning, if only to predict and thereby
minimize its exposure to legal liability.
93. See, e.g., Louis KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE
102-03 (2002) (explaining that the optimal liability rule is the one that minimizes the
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externalities because the applicable liability rule may shift those costs
to the manufacturer. The issue is, of course, when the design-defect test
shifts the costs of injuries to the manufacturer. The analysis begins with
our old friend, the reasonable person. The Third Restatement is
perfectly clear that the evaluative standpoint from which design-defect
claims are to be evaluated is the same as the perspective from which
negligence claims are considered:
Assessment of a product design in most instances requires a
comparison between an alternative design and the product design
that caused the injury, undertaken from the viewpoint of a reasonable
person. That approach is also used in administering the traditional
reasonableness standard in negligence. The policy reasons that
support use of a reasonable-person perspective in connection with
standard also support its use in the products
the general negligence
94
context.
liability

sum of accident costs and precaution costs); WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A.
POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 6-9 (1987) (summarizing the
economic theory of torts as a mechanism for internalizing social costs).
94. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 cmt. d
(AM. LAW INST. 1998) (citation omitted). The "in most instances" proviso in this
Comment refers to the quite rare category of cases in which the plaintiff can establish
defective design without introducing evidence of a RAD. Those cases are mostly
limited to so-called manifestly unreasonable designs, which present a low social
utility and a high degree of danger. See id. cmt. e. The standard example is an
exploding joke cigar, for which no redesign is available that would provide the same
prank characteristics without the risk of causing burns to the consumer. See id., Illus.
5. A few cases have applied the manifestly unreasonable design category to less
obviously ridiculous products, such as above-ground swimming pools. See, e.g.,
O'Brien v. Muskin Corp., 463 A.2d 298 (N.J. 1983). The majority approach, however,
is illustrated by a case involving a backyard trampoline. See Parish v. Jumpking, Inc.,
719 N.W.2d 540 (Iowa 2006). In that case, the plaintiff did not offer proof of an
alternative design but instead relied on the "manifestly unreasonable" category. The
court cited Comment d to the Third Restatement, Section 2, which states that many
common and widely distributed products, such as firearms, alcoholic beverages and,
contra the previously cited O'Brien case, above-ground swimming pools, are
dangerous and cannot be redesigned. However, quoting one of the Reporters to the
Third Restatement, it limited the category of manifestly unreasonable designs to those
in which a trier of fact would conclude that the product was "so bad, so very out loud
bad, so very antisocial, that it would tug against the very grain of the way [the
factfinder] was raise." See id. at 544 (quoting James A. Henderson, Jr., The Habush
Amendment: Section 2(b) comment e, 8 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 86 (1998)).
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Now we have come full circle, back to the claim that the negligence
standard, formulated in terms of what a reasonable person would do,
can be reduced without distorting the economic cost-benefit analysis.
As noted above, a reduction of the reasonable person standard to a
literal application of the CarrollTowing B<PL formula is an inaccurate
description of the way judges instruct juries to apply the negligence
standard. 95 It seems extremely unlikely that juries instructed only very
96
generally, and understood as applying community moral values,
would consider only the comparison between expected accident cost
savings and the expense to the defendant of the untaken precaution.
Rather than focusing on the reasonable person standard in
negligence, which has been debated since time immemorial, we can
look more specifically at design-defect cases arising relatively recently
after courts worked through the puzzles created by the formulation of
the Second Restatement's test in Section 402A. Imagine two rival
designs for a system of sensors, software algorithms, and control
linkages incorporated into a semi-autonomous vehicle. Each design
would deal differently with the same foreseeable situation. The
situation is a car rounding a blind curve and suddenly happening upon
a stalled vehicle with five occupants. The car's speed is such that it
cannot stop in time to avoid a rear-end collision with the stalled vehicle.
However, it has the option of swerving to the right, onto a sidewalk, at
the cost of running over a pedestrian. Having foreseen this situation,
engineers working for the automobile manufacturer have considered
two rival designs, called Utilitarian and Deontological, each of which
is technologically feasible. 97 (These names are problematic, for reasons
to be discussed below.) The decision principle built into Utilitarian
algorithms is to choose the action that will increase the total happiness
of all persons (or sentient beings, if one wishes to modify the problem
to involve a dog on the sidewalk). 98 The Deontological design involves
95. See Kelley & Wendt, supra note 31; Gilles, supra note 31.
96. See, e.g., Catharine Wells, Tort Law as Corrective Justice: A Pragmatic
Justificationfor Jury Adjudication, 88 MICH. L. REv. 2348 (1990).

97. The feasibility of an alternative design is a separate issue from whether the
alternative design embodies a superior net balance of safety and utility. See, e.g.,
Flaminio v. Honda Motor Co., 733 F.2d 463, 468 (7th Cir. 1984).
98. See, e.g., J.J.C. Smart, An Outline of a System of Utilitarian Ethics, in
UTILITARIANISM: FOR AND AGAINST 3, 30 (J.J.C. Smart & Bernard Williams eds.,

1973). For present purposes we can set aside the considerable disagreement within
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a somewhat more complex decision-making algorithm. Essentially, it
boils down to regarding every potentially affected person as having
intrinsically important rights and refusing to permit the vehicle to
interfere with someone's rights as a means of promoting the greater
good. 99 As a result, the rights of a bystander may function as a side
constraint on the algorithm 100 and, consequently, considering an option
to intentionally swerve and kill the pedestrian may be ruled out.
Why do the five occupants of the stalled vehicle not have similar
rights? Here is where the act/omission distinction or the notion of moral
luck may be invoked; the presence of the stalled vehicle is taken as a
given unless the causal sequence of events is altered by an active
intervention of the car's automatic systems. To put it differently,
negative duties (to refrain from killing) are more stringent than positive
duties (to act in ways that prevent foreseeable harms). 101 The crash that
kills five people may be preferred because it was not causally connected
consequentialist moral theory concerning issues such as what is to be maximized
(pleasure, preference satisfaction, or something else); whether outcomes should be
evaluated by averages or aggregates; the relevance of distributional considerations,
such as whether one ought to make the ex ante worst off individual better off; whether
actions, rules, or something else should be evaluated for rightness; and whether one's
duty with respect to the good is to maximize it or merely aim at a certain value
threshold. See, e.g., David 0. Brink, Some Forms and Limits of Consequentialism,in
THE OxFORD HANDBOOK OF ETHICAL THEORY 380 (David Copp ed., 2006). We can

also ignore the substantial practical problem of establishing an average value of the
wrongful-death and survival claims asserted by the foreseeable victims. In the real
world it makes a great deal of difference whether the defendant kills someone with
substantial future earnings rather than a person working in a relatively low-earnings
occupation. See KENNETH R. FEINBERG, WHAT Is LIFE WORTH?: THE INSIDE STORY
OF THE 9/11 FUND AND ITS EFFORT TO COMPENSATE THE VICTIMS OF SEPTEMBER
11TH (2006). There is also the gruesome but inevitable question of whether the victim
died instantly or suffered prolonged, conscious agony prior to death. Many
jurisdictions allow compensation for noneconomic damages resulting from conscious,
pre-death pain and suffering. See David W. Leebron, FinalMoments: Damagesfor
Pain and Suffering Prior to Death, 64 N.Y.U. L. REv. 256 (1989). These
considerations would make a difference to the behavior of even the strictest
Holmesian amoral profit-maximizer but would be very difficult to account for ex ante
in the design of autonomous vehicles.
99. See, e.g., Amartya Sen, Rights andAgency, in CONSEQUENTIALISM AND ITS
CRITICS 187 (Samuel Scheffier ed., 1988).
100.

See ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 28-30 (1974)

(adopting Nozick's formulation of the function of rights).
101.

FOOT, supra note 1; Thomson, supra note 1, at 81.

2018]

THE TROLLEY PROBLEM AND AUTONOMOUS VEHICLES

157

to an intentional act of the system-it was a mere happenstance from
the point of view of the judgment the software had to make.
A manufacturer attempting to predict its legal liability as a result of
adopting one of the rival designs would go through the analysis of
Section 2(b) of the Third Restatement, which asks whether the expected
accident losses could be reduced or eliminated by the adoption of a
RAD. Note that the Holmesian bad man point of view, in which the
manufacturer cares only about legal liability, does not necessarily favor
one of the rival designs over the other. If Utilitarian is a RAD for
Deontological, then a Holmesian "bad manufacturer" might incorporate
as a default option the taking of the pedestrian's life. If, however,
Deontological is a RAD for Utilitarian, because the applicable liability
rule places central importance on the rights of potential victims, then
the decision-making algorithm would reach the opposite result. It is
also extremely important to notice at this point that the comparison
between the rival designs is not straightforwardly consequentialist. Not
only would this analysis beg the question against the Deontological
alternative, but it is not faithful to the factors underlying the RAD
analysis in Section 2. The reasonableness term of the RAD analysis is
not simply whether one life, instead of five lives, would foreseeably be
lost as a result of the adoption of one design. If the reasonableness
analysis is best understood as a principle of corrective justice, it may be
the case that the applicable liability rule requires manufacturers to
design autonomous vehicle systems to avoid violating rights, even at
the cost of allowing harms to befall others. The vehicle's systems do
not kill the five victims-they are merely allowed to die. However, this
seems like a conception of rights that a corrective justice theorist need
not accept. As Judith Jarvis Thomson puts it, "there is no prima facie
duty to refrain from interfering with existing states of affairs just
because they are existing states of affairs." 10 2 Rights being correlative
with duties, the five occupants of the stalled vehicle may have a right
to demand that the autonomous vehicle's systems redirect it into the
pedestrian. As Thomson argues in another article about the trolley
problem, no violation of rights is involved by an agent's redirection of
an existing threat so that it takes one life rather than five. 103 The
vehicle's control software would be changing the path of a threat that
102.
103.

Thomson, supra note 1, at 84.
Id. at 107-09.
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arose exogenously to the vehicle's systems; it would not be creating a
new threat and directing it at the pedestrian.
V.

DESIGN-DEFECT LITIGATION IN THE REAL WORLD

Whatever one thinks of the attempts by Thomson and others to
respond to trolley-type thought experiments, two points bear emphasis.
The first is that the interesting ethical questions related to the trolley
depend on much more than the number of potential victims. The
transplant-surgeon and fat man variations on the trolley problem
demonstrate that while the first level of analysis of the problem is about
rights versus utility, one cannot avoid dealing with deeper questions
relating to the nature of rights, the relevance of intentions, and the
relationship between the agent and the victim. 104 Why might it be
morally permissible for a bystander to turn the trolley onto the side
track, with the foreseeable result of the death of a single person, while
it would not be permissible for a transplant surgeon to harvest the
organs of a healthy person to save the lives of five others? This is a
hard question if one thinks it is a fundamental principle of ethics that
all persons are of equal importance. 10 5 Regarding only strictly
impersonal, impartial values as a source of ethical reasons fails to
account for the intuitive differences between the original trolley case
and the transplant-surgeon variation. Philippa Foot's article that
introduced the trolley problem to ethics relies on the traditional
principle of double effect. 10 6 Thomas Nagel similarly relies on the
agent's intention to explain the idea that one should not kill one person
even to prevent a number of other foreseeable deaths. 107 On Nagel's
account, deontological reasons tell us not to aim at evil as a means to a
good end. 108 The moral quality of an agent's actions depends on the
agent's intentions, not the foreseeable, but not desired, results. That

104.
105.
106.
107.

See, e.g., THOMAs NAGEL, THE VIEW FROM NOWHERE (1986).
See id. at 171.
FOOT, supra note 1, at 19-21.
NAGEL, supra note 104, at 178.

108. Nagel follows Foot in thinking that the doctrine of double effect is the best
solution to the trolley problem. See id. at 179-82.
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means that one cannot do the right thing in the wrong way. 109 Put
simply, the issue is not numbers but the content of mental states.
The second point follows from the first: it would be a significant
challenge for software designers and other engineers to handle a trolleytype scenario in the right way-that is to say, reasonably. It seems
fairly straightforward to implement the Utilitarian design. Systems
must detect the number of people threatened by alternative courses of
action and choose the action which produces the greatest savings in
expected accident losses. 110 Suppose the family of the pedestrian
selected for death by the autonomous systems sues the manufacturer of
the vehicle claiming the vehicle with Utilitarian algorithms is defective
in design. Assuming reasonable minds could differ, the trier of fact will
be instructed to determine whether omission of the Deontological
algorithm renders the vehicle not reasonably safe.111 This is an openended inquiry including not only factors such as the foreseeable risks
of harm, but also the expectations arising from product portrays and
marketing, the utility of the product to the user, and the overall safety
of the product. 112 The bottom line of the design-defect analysis is that
the plaintiff must demonstrate that the harm-here, the death of the
113
pedestrian-was reasonably preventable.
Thinking from the perspective of a juror deciding the issue, there
does seem to be something sinister about autonomous systems altering
the path of a vehicle to aim directly at a pedestrian. Some jurors may
have a Kantian intuition that the pedestrian is being used merely as a

109. See BARBARA HERMAN, Integrity and Impartiality, in THE PRACTICE OF
MORAL JUDGMENT 23 (1993).
110. It should also be noted that an autonomous decision-making system would,

by necessity, be insensitive to some particular features of a situation. For example, a
computer would have no way of knowing if the pedestrian is related to the driver. The
object of ethical analysis is therefore likely to be the rules by which the autonomous
system determines what the vehicle should do. In the language of ethical theory, the
analysis of the vehicle designer's choices would likely be a form of indirect
consequentialism, in which the value of alternative courses of action is assessed in
terms of "the values of the rules of motives under which the action can be subsumed."
Brink, supra note 98, at 384.
111. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 cmt. f (AM.
LAW INST. 1998).
112.
113.

Id.
Id.
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means to the end of saving the lives of the five, 114 and thus, the
pedestrian's sacrifice is unreasonable. (For Kant, what it means to be
reasonable is to serve the objectively grounded end of the welfare of
others, because it is a duty to do so. 1 15) In response, the software
designers could appeal to the doctrine of double effect, which regards
the pedestrian's foreseeable death as a regrettable means to the good
end of saving five lives. The decision-making software did not have an
evil intention, even though it intentionally redirected the path of the car
knowing it would kill the pedestrian. However, this response would
fail to account for the intuition that an autonomous system should
sacrifice the five occupants of the stalled vehicle, if necessary, to protect
the driver of the car. 116 In the lingo of moral philosophy, the identity
of the foreseen-but-not-intended victim, whose welfare will be
sacrificed to save five others, gives rise to an agent-relative reason for
the driver to prefer his own welfare, but not an agent-neutral reason
which would apply to everyone impartially. 117 Should the driver's
agent-relative considerations be taken into account by the systems'
designers, or should they be impartial (agent-neutral) among the
welfare of all potentially affected individuals? The question of
114.
See CHRISTINE M. KORSGAARD, Kant's Formula of Humanity, in
CREATING THE KINGDOM OF ENDS 106 (1996).
115.

Id. at 107-08.

116.
Jean-Frangois Bonnefon, Azim Shariff & Iyad Rahwan, The Social
Dilemma ofAutonomous Vehicles, SCIENCE (June 24, 2016).
117. The idea is that agent-relative, or subjective reasons belong only to the
agent. I have reasons to favor my own interest, and the interests of my family and
friends, which are distinctively my reasons. Others have reasons not to harm my
children-these are agent-neutral reasons, grounding negative duties-but I have
agent-relative reasons others do not share to promote the welfare of my children. See,
e.g., Brink, supra note 98, at 383. This is a fairly standard distinction in modem moral
philosophy, although its centrality for ethics has been questioned in an influential
article resisting the claim that all ethical value must ultimately be agent-neutral. See
CHRISTINE M. KORSGAARD, The Reasons We Can Share:,An Attack on the Distinction
Between Agent-Relative and Agent-Neutral Values, in CREATING THE KINGDOM OF
ENDS 275 (1996). The decision of Mercedes-Benz, mentioned at the beginning of the
article, to program an autonomous Vehicle to kill a child who darted into the road as a
means of preventing a rollover accident that would take the life of the vehicle's driver,
is an example of agent-relative reasoning in action. See Morris, supra note 11. Agentrelative reasons are not'absolute, however, and it may still be an open question
whether the lives of two, three, or more bystanders could permissibly be sacrificed to
save the driver's life.
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reasonableness thus conceals an issue of deep interest to moral
philosophers concerning the types of reasons from which ethical
decision-making should proceed.
The defendant in a design-defect case is the manufacturer, which in
most cases (likely all cases involving mass-marketed automobiles) is a
corporation. The identity of the defendant creates a conceptual
difficulty in the application of ethical concepts such as agent-relative
reasons, the doctrine of double effect, and the prohibition on aiming at
evil. One may wonder how a jury is supposed to assess the intentions
of a corporation, which is capable of legal responsibility but is not a
natural person. "How do [jurors] determine whether a group has intent
or responsibility when those very terms are usually associated with
8 One answer is that jurors do not
individual, sentient human beings?" 11
assess the intention of a fictional person, but the mental state of specific
human beings such as designers and engineers. 119 Presumably, a
plaintiff s lawyer could depose the lead systems-integration or software
engineer who worked on an autonomous vehicle design to determine
that person's intentions regarding a trolley-type scenario. But even that
inquiry would not reveal whether the victim should be regarded as a
regrettable side-effect of a morally permissible intention, thereby
exonerating the manufacturer from liability. Sophisticated critics of
utilitarianism emphasize the importance of the agent's integrity,
understood as a commitment to a distinctive set of projects and
relationships. 20 It is not an exaggeration to say that the trolley problem
was invented and developed to focus on the character of these
deontological reasons. Jurors would have no choice but to ascribe them
to a human engineer or to an autonomous system because otherwise
there is no way of making sense of the idea of acting reasonably.
Intention is inescapable in ethical reasoning. 121
118. VALERIE P. HANs, BusINEss ON TRIAL: THE CIVIL JURY AND CORPORATE
RESPONSIBILITY 79 (2000).

Id. at 85 (noting that jurors tend to focus on specific individuals rather
119.
than the missing corporate "person").
120. See, e.g., KORSGAARD, supra note 117, at 282; NAGEL, supra note 104, at
168; Bernard Williams, Persons, Character,and Morality, in MORAL LUCK 1 (1981).

121. An additional complication is suggested by research showing that people's
intuitions concerning the intentions of others-which presumably would be directly
implicated in a design-defect case in which the intentions of the manufacturer's
employees would be at issue-are influenced by the moral goodness of the outcome.
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That reasoning task would be required unless one fell back on the
utilitarian strategy of relying on a simplistic tally of foreseeable victims
associated with two or more options. 122 This is not only impoverished
ethical reasoning, 123 it is also a gross misinterpretation of the Third
Restatement design-defect standard. The ultimate issue in contention
in a design-defect case is whether the product embodies a reasonable
balance between safety, including the protection of third parties, and
utility to the consumer. There is no algorithm for making this
determination. As long as there is sufficient evidence to create a triable
issue of fact, the jury must balance factors such as the feasibility of an
alternative design, the likelihood and gravity of expected harm, and the
disadvantages of the plaintiffs proposed alternative design. 124 The
number of potential victims associated with different branches in the
decision tree is a factor to be considered as an advantage or
disadvantage of the plaintiffs proposed alternative design, but it is not
See Joshua Knobe, The Concept of IntentionalAction: A Case Study in the Uses of
Folk Psychology, in EXPERIMENTAL PHILOSOPHY 129 (Joshua Knobe & Shaun

Nichols eds., 2008). For example, the judgment of whether an actor is said to have
brought about a side effect intentionally is influenced by whether the side effect is
good or bad. Id. at 133. In the Mercedes case, referenced supra note 11, a jury might
determine that the car's action of killing a child who accidentally wandered into the
road is wrong, and, thus, the manufacturer's design decision was unreasonable, even
though the car acted to save the driver's life. Why? Because the child's death is a bad
outcome. This is not conclusive of the ethical analysis. People may be mistaken, and
their intuitive response may be subject to criticism. The extent to which experimental
evidence should matter to moral philosophers is a currently a contested issue,
particularly given the perennial question of how one is to derive an "ought" from an
"is." See Joshua Knobe & Shaun Nichols, An Experimental Philosophy Manifesto, in
EXPERIMENTAL PHILOSOPHY, supra, at 3, 10; Kwame Anthony Appiah, Experimental
Philosophy, in EXPERIMENTAL ETHICS: TOWARD AN EMPIRICAL MORAL PHILOSOPHY
7, 15-16 (Christoph Luetge et al. eds., 2014). Outside of philosophy, however,
whether they are fully committed Holmesian bad men or not, trial lawyers would
presumably be quite interested to know how jurors actually apply the concept of
intentional action.
122. See KORSGAARD, supra note 117, at 283 (noting the familiar strategy of
dismissing deontological considerations and "castigat[ing] people who spend their
time on worthless activities as irrational").
123. See Bernard Williams, A Critique of Utilitarianism,in UTILITARIANISM:
FOR AND AGAINST, supra note 98, at 77, 99 (criticizing utilitarianism not for giving
the wrong answer in a case like this, but for believing that it is obvious what the right
answer should be).
124. See, e.g., Cal. Civ. Jury Instr. § 1204.
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dispositive. A jury might believe it is obvious that an autonomous
vehicle's systems should steer it toward a single bystander to save five
others but may also believe that it is wrong to program a vehicle to
deliberately take the life of a bystander to avoid a greater number of
deaths. Nothing in the law of liability for design defects precludes
either of these conclusions.
VI. CONCLUSION

Far from putting an end to the ethical dilemmas potentially
encountered by autonomous vehicles, the law requires manufacturers to
engage in ethical reasoning, even if they do not want to. The designdefect standard calls upon the jury to consider whether the
manufacturer's design choices were reasonable. Despite the best efforts
of law and economic theorists, the reasonableness inquiry cannot be
reduced to economic cost-benefit analysis along the lines of Richard
Posner's interpretation of the CarrollTowing formula. Design-defect
analysis does involve balancing expected harms and utilities, but these
quantities cannot necessarily be measured in dollar terms. The
functionality, usefulness, aesthetics, and headaches associated with
safety features are all part of the risk-utility analysis, even for relatively
simple products. When it comes to a complex semi- or fully
autonomous vehicle with integrated sensor, control, and decisionmaking systems, a wide range of factors will inform the reasonableness
analysis. One hopes that trolley-type situations will be extremely rare,
and that automated systems will be able to intervene farther back in the
accident sequence to avoid the necessity of choosing between one life
and many. If it comes down to it, however, the decision procedure
embodied in the vehicle's software may determine who lives and who
dies. That decision will be evaluated by ordinary people, acting as
judges and juries, using whatever resources bear on the question of
reasonableness. This is not an amoral domain at all, but a richly
moralized one. Even manufacturers who are concerned only with
minimizing their exposure to legal liability should think through the
ethical issues presented in these unusual cases.

